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Victorinus … scripsit Adversus Arium libros 
more dialectico valde obscuros qui nisi ab 
eruditis non intelliguntur. 
 
Jerome, De viris. ill., 
PL 23, cols. 739ff. 
 
 
“The accepted statement that Augustine’s De Trinitate is the first systematic 
exposition of its kind is not quite correct: it takes no account of Marius Victorinus.”1 
Indeed sometime between 357 and 363,2 roughly half a century before Augustine’s great 
treatise,3 Caius Marius Victorinus4 did compose a series of writings in which he 
developed at length the doctrine of the Trinity as held by orthodox Christianity. In this 
paper, I shall examine the thought of Marius Victorinus as it is presented in these 
writings. 
I shall not be greatly concerned here to explore Victorinus’s neo-Platonic sources, 
or to evaluate the extent of his subsequent influence on Augustine.5 Neither shall I 
concern myself with a detailed discussion of the Arian controversies in the heat of which 
Victorinus composed these works. Instead, I shall map out the main articulations of 
Victorinus’s universe (section I) and its application to his doctrine of the Trinity (section 
                                                 
1  Paul Henry, “The Adversus Arium of Marius Victorinus: The First Systematic Exposition of the 
Doctrine of the Trinity,” Journal of Theological Studies, n. s. 1 (1950), p. 43. 
2 Paul Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus: Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, pp. 28–60. 
3 The De trinitate was written 399–419. See Berthold Altaner & Alfred Stuiber, Patrologie, p. 
426. 
4 On the name, see Paul Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’Afrique chrétienne, III, p. 373, n. 2 ; 
and Charles Gore, “Victorinus,” in A Dictionary of Christian Biography,  IV, p. 1129. 
5 On the latter point, see the brief but useful overview by Henry, op. cit., pp. 52–55. 
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II), before drawing some conclusions and making some observations on it against the 
backdrop of Étienne Gilson’s assessment (section III). 
The details of Victorinus’s biography need not long detain us. He was born6 a 
pagan, left his native Africa sometime after 3377 and went to Rome. There he opened a 
school of rhetoric and soon rose to great prominence.8 He wrote several works during this 
period and in particular translated at least part of Plotinus’s Enneads into Latin.9 
Around the year 355,10 Victorinus was converted to Christianity.11 Soon 
thereafter, he began his literary works in defense of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. 
Of the writings from this Christian period, three deal systematically and at some length 
with the Trinity: 
1. Liber de generatione divini Verbi (otherwise known as his letter Ad 
Candidum), a letter from Victorinus to his Arian friend Candidus, in reply 
to the latter’s letter De generatione divina. 
2. The long work Adversus Arium, in four books. 
3. A brief summary of book II of the Adversus Arium, entitled De homoousio 
recipiendo.12 
                                                 
6 On the dates of his birth and death, see Albert H. Travis, “Marius Victorinus: A Biographical 
Note,” The Harvard Theological Review, 36 (1943), pp. 83–90. 
7 Monceaux, op. cit., p. 374. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pp. 381–95. On the works of this period, see also Hadot, op. sit., pp. 101f. 
10 Monceaux, op. cit., p. 378. 
11 See the account in Augustine’s Confessions, VIII.2.3–5. 
12 See Hadot, op. cit., pp. 18–59, for a discussion of the chronology of and relations among these 
works, and the circumstances under which they were written. Victorinus’s Christian writings also include 
three hymns on the Trinity (contained in Henry, ed., Marius Victorinus, pp. 619–53) and commentaries on 
three epistles of St. Paul (Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians—all in PL 8, 1145–1294). On the latter, see 
Alexander Souter, The Earliest Latin Commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul, pp. 8–38. 
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I 
I turn now to some of the principles set out in the Liber de generatione divini 
Verbi. This letter is a reply to one from Candidus to Victorinus. Candidus had set out an 
Arian position that denied the generation of the divine Word. The argument, in brief, ran 
as follows: All generation is a kind of change; now God is immutable; therefore, in God 
there is no generation. That is, he neither is generated nor does he generate anything.13 
Again, if there are generated things, there is something else that generates them. 
Therefore, that from which all things are must be ungenerated. Now God is that from 
which all things are, and therefore God is ungenerated. What is the cause of God’s 
existing? It is God’s existing itself. Neither ought one to imagine any sort of duality here, 
for God is one and single. He is esse solum. He is unalitas simplex et unum simplex. Now 
the simple is the principle of the composite. It itself has no principle, since it is the 
principle. But this is God. Thus, God is without origin, and is therefore ungenerated.14 
                                                 
13 De generatione divina, no. 1, Henry ed., Marius Victorinus, p. 106, lines 4–10: “Omnis 
generatio … mutatio quaedam est. Inmutabile autem est omne divinum, scilicet deus, deus autem, qui pater 
est, in omnibus et omnium prima causa. Si igitur deus, inversibile et inmutabile, quod autem inversibile et 
inmutabile, neque genitum est neque generat aliquid, si igitur hoc sic he habet, ingenitus est deus. ” (All 
subsequent references to Candidus’s letter, and to the works of Victorinus, will be to Henry’s edition.) 
14 Ibid., no. 3, p. 110, lines 7–16: “Si genita, aliud fuit, a quo genita ista. Ingenitum igitur illud, ex 
quo ista omnia, ex quibus omnia. Quid istud illud est, ex quo omnia? Deus. Ingenitus igitur deus, siquidem 
causa istorum omnium deus. Quid vero? Esse deum qualis aut quae causa? Hoc ipsum deum esse. Etenim 
prima causa et sibi causa est, non quae sit altera alterius, sed hoc ipsum, quod  ipsum est, ad id, ut sit, causa 
est. Ipse sibi locus, ipse habitator, ut non imaginatio duorum fiat. Ipse est unum et solum. Est enim esse 
solum.” See also ibid., lines 21–25: “Simplex autem principium conpositorum. Principium autem sine 
principio. Praecedit enim nullum principium ante se habens,  propter quod est principium. Hoc autem est 
deus. Sine ortu igitur est ingenitus et deus. Deus ergo ingenitus.” 
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The conclusion of all this is that Jesus Christ, the λόγος, is not generated by God, 
but rather made by him. He is the first and principal work of God, made from nothing.15 
In his reply to Candidus, Victorinus speaks of God (i.e., the Father16) as above all 
things, both those that are and those that are not. He is totum προόν, generating the Son, 
the λόγος, Jesus, who is ipsum hoc totum ὄν.17 But what are we to say of God? Even 
though he is clearly above that which is truly ὄν,18 yet we cannot say without further ado 
that he therefore is not.19 For he is the cause of all things, including those that are. But if 
is their cause, he is not that which is not.20 
Put another way, what are we to call God, ὂν an τὸ μὴ ὄν? On the one hand, he is 
ὄν, since he is the father of everything that is. On the other hand, precisely because he is 
                                                 
15 Ibid., no. 10, p. 122, lines 1–9: “Quid autem ex istis omnibus cogitur atque colligitur …? 
Quoniam dei filius, qui est λόγος apud deum, Iesus Christus, per quem effecta sunt omnia et sine quo nihil 
factum est, neque generatione a deo, sed operatione a deo, est primum opus et principale dei … Effecit 
autem ex his quae non sunt, quoniam potentia dei, quod non est, adducit, ut sit.” 
16 See Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 32: “… when he [= Victorinus] says God, 
we must understand God the Father.” 
17 Ad Candidum, no. 2, p. 134, lines 18–35: “Quid enim putamus deum esse? Etsi quidem 
putamus deum esse supra omnia et quae sunt et quae non sunt, attamen id quod sit, non id quod non sit, 
deum esse credimus. Praestat igitur quod est, et praestat per ineffabilem generationem et praestat 
exsistentiam, νοῦν, vitam, non, qui sit ista, sed supra omnia. Si igitur deus, quod non est, non est, est autem 
quod supra id est quod est vere ὄν, potentia ipsius τοῦ ὄντος, quae, operatione in generationem excitata, 
ineloquibili motu genuit τὸ ὄν omnimodis perfectum, a toto potentiae totum τὸ ὄν, deus igitur est totum 
προόν, Iesus autem ipsum hoc totum ὄν, sed iam in exsistentia et vita et intelligentia, universale omnimodis 
perfectum ὄν. Hic est filius, hic omnis λόγος, hic qui apud deum et in deo λόγος, hic Iesus Christus, ante 
omnia, quae sunt et quae vere sunt, prima et omnis exsistentia, prima et omnis intellegentia, primum et 
omnimodis perfectum ὄν, ipsum ὄν, primum nomen ante omnia nomina; ab isto etenim omnia nomina, 
sicuti declarabitur.” 
18 See n. 17 above: “… est autem supra id est quod est vere ὄν …” 
19 Ibid.: “Etsi quidem putamus … esse credimus.” 
20 Ad Candidum, no. 3, p. 134, lines 2–4: “Si enim deus omnium causa est, et eius cui est esse et 
cui est non esse, causa deus est. Sed si causa, non est id quod non est.” 
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father, he cannot be τὸ ὄν. For the cause is prior to what it causes, and it is therefore 
wickedness to call “ὄν” the cause of that which is.21 
It is apparently at least partially in order to clarify this paradox that Victorinus 
undertakes to analyze the various ways we may say of something that it is not. Id quod 
non est, he says, is understand and said in four senses22: 
1. according to a negation—i.e., a complete privation of an existent; 
2. according as one thing is not another; 
3. according as future contingents do not yet exist; 
4. according to that which is esse, above all things that are. 
God  is thus called “μὴ ὄν” in the sense that he is above ὄν (sense 4), not by way 
of a privation of all that he is (sense 1), but as a different ὄν (sense 2), namely, ipsum 
quod est μὴ ὄν.23 He is also called “τὸ μὴ ὄν” with respect to those things that are about 
to be (sense 3).24 On the other hand, God is the cause of the generation of those things 
that are, and is thus called “τὸ ὄν.”25 
                                                 
21 Ibid., no. 4, p. 136, lines 6–11: “Quid igitur dicimus deum, ὂν an τὸ μὴ ὄν? Appellabimus 
utique omnino ὄν, quoniam eorum quae sunt, pater est. Sed pater eorum quae sunt, non est τὸ ὄν; nondum 
enim sunt ea quorum pater est, et non licet dicere, nefas est intellegere, eorum quae sunt causam ὂν 
appellare. Causa enim prior est ab his quorum causa est.” 
22 Ibid., lines 1–5: “Definiendum igitur id quod non est. Quod quidem intellegitur et vocatur 
quattuor modis: iuxta negationem, omnino omnimodis ut privatio sit exsistentis, iuxta alterius ad aliud 
naturam, iuxta nondum esse, quod futurum est et potest esse, iuxta quod supra omnia quae sunt, est esse.” 
23 Ibid., lines 11–14: “Supra ὂν igitur deus est et, iuxta quod supra est, μὴ ὂν deus dicitur, non per 
privationem universi eius quod sit, sed ut aliud ὄν, ipsum quod est μὴ ὄν …” 
24 Ibid., line 14: “… iuxta ea quae futura sunt, τὸ μὴ ὄν, …” 
25 Ibid., lines 15f.: “… iuxta quod causa est ad generationem eorum quae sunt, τὸ ὄν.” 
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Thus, God (the Father) both transcends ὄν and generates it. It is this that 
Victorinus seems to have in mind when he speaks of God as totum προόν.26 
If this is the Father, what is to be said of the Son? He is ipsum hoc totum ὄν, 
before all that is and all that truly is, the first and in every way perfect ὄν, ὄν itself, the 
first name before every name.27 But, just as there were four senses in which we may say 
something is not, so too, in order to locate the Son more precisely, Victorinus 
distinguishes four types of  beings. These four are arranged in a definite hierarchical 
order, as four levels: that which truly is, that which is, that which not really is not, and 
that which is not.28 God (the Father) is above and outside this fourfold hierarchy, as its 
cause.29 He produces the things that are and the things that are not—i.e., the fourfold 
hierarchy—either by generation or by “creation” (effectionem).30 
At the bottom of the hierarchy is that which is not, i.e., matter.31 Note however 
that when Victorinus is speaking of the things that are not (quae non sunt), he does not 
                                                 
26 See n. 17 above: “Si igitur deus … totum προόν.” See also Ernst Benz, Marius Victorinus und 
die Entwicklung der abendländischen Willensmetaphysik, p. 42. 
27 See n. 17 above: “… Iesus autem … ante omnia nomina.” 
28 Ad Candidum, no. 6, p. 138, lines 5–7: “Ipsorum autem quae sunt, alia sunt, vere quae sunt, alia, 
quae sunt, alia, quae non vere non sunt, alia, quae non sunt.” On the origins of this classification, see 
Friedrich Wilhelm Kohnke, “Plato’s conception of τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,” Phronesis, vol. 2, n. 1 (1957), pp. 
32–40. 
29 Ad Candidum, no. 6, p. 138, lines 1–3: “Primo igitur deus et super quae sunt est et super quae 
non sunt, quippe generator ipsorum et pater, iuxta quod causa est.” 
30 Ibid., lines 3–5: “Deinde secundum generationem a deo aut secundum effectionem, quae sunt, 
apparuerunt. Apparuerunt autem et μὴ ὄντα.” 
31 Ibid., no. 10, pp. 144, 146, lines 7–37: “Cum enim subintellegimus solam inanimam ὕλην—
inanimum autem dico, quidquid sine intellectuali anima est—circumlato sensu circa qualitates quasi 
conprehendit, quae μὴ ὄντα sunt. Versibiles enim qualitates et iuxta hoc μὴ ὄντα. Etenim id ipsum 
subiectum, quae ὕλη dicitur, indeterminatum est, et ideo sine qualitate dicitur. Si autem determinatur, 
qualitas dicitur, non qualis ὕλη. … De his quae non sunt, nunc sic habeto.” 
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mean that which truly is not. For this latter is a pure fiction.32 God is the father of the 
things that are and the things that are not. But the things that are not, of which he is the 
father, are not to be thought of as not being, as it were, through a privation of the things 
that are. For nothing of this sort either is understood or exists.33 Thus, when Victorinus 
speaks of that which is not, he is referring to matter, and not to what is the absolute lack 
or absence of some being. 
Above that which is not is that which not truly is not. These are the things 
composed of matter and form, those for which to be is in a certain way to be and not to 
be.34 
Still higher are the things that are. These are the intellectualia, and “merely are,” 
as distinct from the intellectibilia, which truly are, on the next and highest level.35 These 
intellectualia are souls.36 
                                                 
32 Ibid., no. 6, p. 138, lines 7–13: “At illa, quae vere non sunt, non recipit esse plenitudo dei. Iuxta 
enim quod est esse et aliquo modo esse, plenitudo plenitudo est, sola enfasi exsistente in intellegentia 
eorum quae vere non sunt, quae iuxta subiectionem, ab his quae non vere quidem sunt, quodam tamen 
modo sunt incipiens imaginata est circa id quod vere non est.” 
33 Ibid., no. 5, pp. 136, 138, lines 1–6: “Verum est igitur dicere deum patrem esse et iuxta causam 
esse et eorum quae sunt et eorum quae non sunt. Voluntate igitur dei in genenerationem veniunt et quae 
sunt et quae non sunt. Et non aestimes quae non sunt, quasi per privationem eorum quae sunt. Nihil enim 
istorum neque intellegitur neque exsistit.” 
34 Ibid., no. 9, p. 142, lines 15–17: “… et est illis esse quodam modo esse et non esse. Caelum 
etenim et omnia in eo et universus mundus ex ὔλη, consistens et specie in conmixtione est; ergo non est 
simplex.” 
35 Ibid., no. 7, p. 140, lines 13f.: “ergo intellectibilia ea sunt quae vere sunt, intellectualia, quae 
sunt tantum.” 
36 So, at least, according to Hadot (“Commentaire” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., p. 706). 
Gilson, on the other hand, seems to put soul in the class of things that not truly are not, while the 
intellectualia are found in human souls (Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, p. 68. The 
account, however, is not clear.) The problem perhaps turns on the meaning of  “in natura” in “Sunt autem 
ista [i.e., intellectualia] omnia animarum in natura intellectualium nondum intellectum habentium, sed ad 
intelligentiam accomodata” (Ad Candidum, no. 7, p. 140, lines 14–16). Hadot takes “natura” in the sense 
of “class,” and appeals to Ad Candidum, no. 9, p. 142, line 19, where the word is used in that sense (Hadot, 
loc. cit.). 
(Continued) 
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Highest in the fourfold hierarchy of beings are those that truly are, the 
intellectibilia.37 This level is divided into three sub-levels. First—i.e., lowest—are all 
supercaelestia, ut spiritus, νοῦς, anima, cognoscentia, disciplina, virtutes, λόγοι, 
opiniones, perfectio, exsistentia, vita, intellegentia.38 Above there are existentialitas, 
vitalitas,” and “intellegentitas.39 
Finally, above all these, and at the very apex of the hierarchy of what is and what 
is not, stands ὂν solum istud ipsum quod est unum et solum ὄν.40 But this is Jesus, the 
Son.41 Now we have already located the Father above all that which is and all that which 
is not. Here then we locate the Son, at the very pinnacle of all that which is and all that 
which is not.42 
II 
What does all this come to? What is Victorinus’s purpose in mapping out his 
universe in such detail? It enables him, at least, to reply to Candidus’s statement that 
Jesus was not generated but rather made by God out of nothing. For, according to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gilson’s account of Victorinus (op. cit., pp. 67–69,  587–89 [notes]), twice associates the wrong 
work with the wrong man. On p. 67, in the second paragraph, he speaks of Candidus’s letter as “On the 
Generation of the Divine Word.” This is rather the title of Victorinus’s reply; Candidus’s letter is entitled 
“On Divine Generation.” On p. 588, n. 4, the opposite error is made: Victorinus’s work is cited as “Liber 
de generatione divina.” 
37 See n. 35 above. 
38 Ad Candidum, no. 7, p. 138, lines 3–5. 
39 Ibid., lines 5f. On the origins of these two schemata, see Hadot, “Commentaire” to Marius 
Victorinus, Henry, ed., pp. 705f. 
40 Ad Candidum, no. 7, pp. 138, 140, lines 6f. 
41 See n. 17 above: “Iesus autem … ante omnia nomina.” 
42 See also Hadot, loc. cit. 
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Victorinus, the Father generates the Son “from himself.”43 Hadot44 glosses this passage 
by pointing out that in a sense Candidus was right. The Son comes from “nothing”—only 
it is from that μὴ ὄν that is above all that is or is not, namely from the Father, that the Son 
comes. He is not made from the nothing that is a privation of being. 
This brings us to Victorinus’s properly Trinitarian doctrine. How are we to think 
of the relation of Father and Son? How is the Son generated? And, for that matter, what 
about the Holy Spirit? How are the three different and yet consubstantial? 
Here we reach one of the basic principles of Victorinus’s Trinitarian theology: 
Quod enim supra ὂν est, absconditum ὂν est.45 The Son is hidden in the Father—or 
rather, the Son is ὄν as manifest, while the Father is ὄν as hidden. The making manifest of 
what is hidden in the Father is precisely the generation by which the Son is generated.46 
The Son is therefore in the Father. The Son, the λόγος,47 is patrica activa 
quaedam potentia et quae in motu sit et quae se ipsam constituat, ut sit in actu, non in 
                                                 
43 Ad Candidum, no. 14, p. 150, lines 6–11: “Deus, qui supra ὂν est, ab eo quod ipse est, sicut ipse 
est, producit an ab alio an a nullo? Ab  alio? Et quo alio? Nihil enim ante deum fuit neque ut deo ex altero 
par. A nullo igitur. Et quomodo? Si enim τὸ ὂν produxit, verum est dicere, quoniam a semet ipso, qui super 
τὸ ὂν est, τὸ ὂν generavit quam de nihilo.” 
44 Hadot, “Commentaire” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., pp. 713f. 
45 Ad Candidum, no. 14, p. 150, lines 11f. 
46 Ibid., lines 12–27: “Absconditi vero manifestatio generatio est, siquidem et potentia ὂν 
operatione ὂν generat. Nihil enim sine causa in generatione … Etenim gravida occultum habet quod 
paritura est. Non enim fetus non est ante partum, sed in occulto est et generatione provenit in 
manifestationem ὂν operatione quod fuit ὂν potentia, et ut, quod verum est, dicam, ὂν operatione τοῦ ὄντος; 
etenim foris operatio generat. Quid autem generat? Quod fuit intus. Quid igitur fuit intus in deo? Nihil aliud 
quam τὸ ὂν, magis autem προόν, quod est supra generale ὄν genus, quod supra ὄντως ὄντα, ὂν iam operante 
potentia. Hic est Iesus Christus. Dixit enim ipsa: si interrogaverit: quis te misit? dicito ὁ ὤν. Solum enim 
illud ὄν semper ὄν, ὁ ὢν est.” Gilson takes this last point as key evidence for the true position of being in 
Victorinus’s doctrine. (Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 33.) 
47 Adversus Arium, I, 56, 15–18, p. 364: “Verbum igitur et vox filius est, ipse vita, ipse λόγος, ipse 
motus, ipse νοῦς, ipse sapientia, ipse exsisentia et substantia prima, ipse actio potentialis, ipse ὂν primum, 
vere ὂν ex quo omnia ὄντα et per quem et in quo, …” 
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potentia.48 Now Victorinus thinks of God as fundamentally active.49 Yet esse is in some 
way prior to operari. Esse is identified here with the Father, while the operari of this esse 
is the Son.50 
Again, using another set of terminology, Victorinus speaks of the Son as the form 
of the esse that is the Father.51 It is through the Son, the form, that the Father is known.52 
These two, esse and forma, are always together, the form is the esse and the esse the 
form. Hence, the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father.53 
How is the Son generated? The Son is in the Father. Now the Son is form. 
Therefore, the form is in the Father. But, as in the Father, this form is indiscreta et 
infinita.54 How then does the form—the Son—appear? Is it “sent out” (emissa) or is it 
through its own movement that it appears?55 After rejecting various alternatives, 
                                                 
48 Ad Candidum, no. 17, p. 154, lines 2–4. 
49 Ibid., lines 6f.: “Operatur ergo deus per λόγον et semper operatur.” Again,  ibid. no. 20, p. 158, 
line 11: “In eo enim quod est esse, inest et operari.” 
50 Ibid., no. 19, p. 156, lines 1–6: “Sed quoniam esse ipsum, quod est moveri et ingellegere, hoc 
est agere, primum est potentia et constitutiva potentia primum, inquam, est, necessario igitur ipsum esse 
praecedit. Ergo et moveri et intellegere et agere ab eo est, quod est esse. Est autem secundum quod est in 
actu esse, hoc est filium esse.” Again, ibid., no. 20, p. 158, lines 13–18: “Oportet enim esse primum, cui 
inest operari. Et sunt ista duo; secundum virtutem dico duo, secundum autem intellegentiam simplicitatis 
unum et solum. Si igitur causa est ipsum esse ad actionem, generator agere ab eo quod est esse. Esse autem 
pater est, operari ergo filius.” 
51 Adversus Arium, II, 4, 18–22, p. 406: “Quod autem formatum est,  hoc est esse; forma vero est, 
quae intellegi facit illud quod est esse. Hoc ergo quod est esse, deo damus, formam autem, Christo, quia per 
filium cognoscitur pater, id est per formam, quod est esse; et hic dictum est: qui me vidit, vidit et patrem.” 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., lines 24–29: “Et quia semper simul sunt, et forma esse est, et ipsum esse forma, unde 
pater in filio et filius in patre. Est enim esse et in patre, quod est potentia, quod prius est ab eo quod est 
forma. Est item rursus et in filio esse, sed istud quod est esse proprium a patre habet, ut sit illi formam esse. 
Alter ergo in altero, at ambo unum.” See also Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., pp. 
78f. 
54 Adversus Arium, IV, 20, 28, p. 560: “Sed cum illa intus forma indiscreta et infinita sit, …” 
55 Ibid., lines 26f.: “Et utrum ipsa forma, quae intus est, emissa foras est, an se ipsa eiecit?” 
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Victorinus concludes that this form originates from itself.56 This is the “autogeneration” 
of the Son.57 In an interesting passage from the Ad Candidum, Victorinus speaks of the 
λόγος as proceeding, by a motion generated from itself, from that which is esse, the 
Father, to its own esse (as Son). Yet, just as esse (the Father) has both esse and agere, so 
too does this agere (the Son) have esse. Thus, these two are one and simple.58 
Using yet a third term, Victorinus speaks of the Son as the life of the esse that is 
the Father. For the form is the life, and it is this form-life in which God (the Father) is 
seen.59 Thus, in accordance with the thesis that the Father and the Son are in one another, 
life is in the Father. There is therefore an inward and an outward life. The Father lives, 
and so likewise life, the Son, lives.60 
In the last book of the Adversus Arium, Victorinus treats this notion more 
precisely, distinguishing vivere from vita. Vivere is in some way prior to vita, even 
                                                 
56 Ibid., no. 21, p. 562, lines 6f.: “Num ergo quod reliquum est, dicere audemus? A se orta haec 
forma est.” 
57 Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., p. 81. 
58 Ad Candidum, no. 22, p. 160, lines 10–18: “Λόγος ergo, qui est in deo ipse deus, qui est ipse et 
voluntas, ipse intellegentia et actio et vita, ex se genito motu ab eo quod est esse, processit in esse suum 
proprium, id est, in quod est agere, apparuit ipsum agere, quod quidem effecit omnia. Ipsum vero natum est 
ab eo quod esse in id quod est agere, habens in eo quod est agere et esse. Sicut illud esse et agere habet et 
esse, sic hoc agere habet et esse; ipsum autem agere hoc est esse, ut illud esse hoc est quod agere. Unum 
ergo et simplex haec duo.” 
59 Adversus Arium, I, 53, 13–26, p. 356: “Deus autem ut velatum quiddam est. Nemo enim videt 
deum. Forma igitur filius, in qua videtur deus. Si enim exsistentia deus, potentia, substantia, motus et vita in 
occulto, deus velut sine forma. Ergo si manifesta vita et manifesta iuxta motus potentiam, vita iuxta motum 
in occulto, in apparentia, in exsistente motione intellegitur, pronuntiatur, videtur. Adhuc si, quod est esse, 
pater, quod autem vita, filius, cum sit inpossibile id quod est esse, conprehendere—in occulto enim illud 
esse—vita autem, iuxta quod vita est, iam et illud est esse, in vita igitur apparet, quod est esse. Forma igitur 
vita, eius quod est esse. Sed enim pater deus, quod est esse, filius autem vita. Filius ergo, vita patris, dei 
forma est, in qua speculatur potentia patrica.” Therefore, we ought to believe in the Son of God, in order 
that true and eternal life might be in us. Ibid., lines 26f.: “Credendum igitur in filium dei, ut vita in nobis 
fiat, quae est et vera et aeterna vita.” 
60 Ibid., 52, 46–51, p. 354: “Rursus vita, secundum quod motio est procedens a patrica motione, et 
intus et foris est. Sed enim vita motio est. Vita igitur et intus et foris est. Vivit igitur deus, vivit ipsa vita. 
Vita ergo, et deus est et vita. Unum igitur ista duo et in unoquoque et alterum et idem. In filio igitur pater et 
in patre filius.” 
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though in that in which there is vivere there is also vita. Vivere is the parens of vita. God 
(the Father) is vivere; the Son is vita.61 Once again, Father and Son are in one another; for 
in that which is vivere, there is vita, and conversely.62 
Here also Victorinus probes more deeply into the way the Son is generated from 
the Father. We have already see that the Father is esse and vivere. Victorinus now speaks 
of him as intellegere as well. We shall soon see how this is tied up with the Holy Spirit. 
Here, however, Victorinus observes once again that the Son is the form of God. Now 
when God understands (intellegit) himself, it is this form that he understands.63 But this 
form itself must also understand, since it is a living and understanding existence. It must 
indeed understand itself. When this understanding understands that it is understanding 
(intellegentia), it understood and made itself outwardly,64 by its own motion. This is the 
Son, the λόγος.65 There are thus two intelligences, one inward because it belongs to esse, 
and the other outward that belongs to “understanding-esse” (quod est illi intellegendo 
                                                 
61 Ibid., IV, 6, 8–21, p. 516: “Prius est igitur vivere quam vita, quamquam in eo quod est vivere, 
vita sit, sed vivere ut parens vitae est, vita, et proles et quod gignitur, quippe a vivente generata. Deus igitur 
est vivere, illud primum vivere, a semet ipso vivere, ante omnium vivere, et ante ipsius vitae vivere … 
Deus ergo vivere est et principale vivere, vita autem ut genitum. Vivere ergo pater est, vita filius. Numque 
quod in eo facum est, vita est. Et ipse filius ita dicit: ego sum via, ego veritas, ego vita. Haec vita est quae 
orta est ab eo quod pater vivit.” 
62 Ibid., 13, 29–34, p. 538: “Vivere autem deus est, vita Christus, et in eo quod est vivere, vita est, 
et in eo quod est vita, vivere … Ergo et pater in filio et filius in patre.” 
63 Here again we see the notion of the Son as revealing the Father. See n. 51 above. The Father 
can be known only through his form, the Son. Adversus Arium, IV, 28, 6, p. 582: “Nam ipsum [= patrem] 
nemo vidit umquam.” Compare John 1:18. 
64 The change of tense is in the Latin. 
65 Adversus Arium, IV, 28, 1–16, p. 582: “Verum quoniam imaginem dei filium dicimus dei—
genita est enim forma ut, ab eo quod est esse, vivere, intellegere, gigneretur exsistentia, vita, intellegentia; 
quaedam enim in his forma est per quam, ut per imaginem, intellegatur quid sit esse, vivere et intellegere—
necessario per formam intellegitur deus. Nam ipsum nemo vidit umquam. Ergo forma dei, cum accipitur in 
deo, deus est. Cum autem intellegit se deus, per formam se intellegit. Sed et  ipsa forma intellegat necesse 
est. Est enim intellegens ac vivens exsistentia, cum nihil aliud intellegat quam quod ista deus sunt; et haec 
saepe iam docui. Cum autem ipsa intellegentia intellegit quod sit intellegentia—necessario enim sequitur ut 
et se intellegat intellegentia—veluti exiens a semet ipsa, se intellexit fecitque se extra, quod foris est, 
intellegendo se, id est motu suo. Unde est haec foris intellegentia. Et hic est filius, hic est λόγος …” 
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esse). This latter is the Son,66 and since it understands understanding, which is true light, 
it is a lumen ex lumine and a verum lumen ex vero lumine. Since also the inward 
understanding is God, the outward understanding (the Son, which is understanding by 
understanding itself) is deus ex deo.67 
In touching on understanding and intelligence, one enters, so to speak, the 
territory of the Holy Spirit. Victorinus devotes most of his writing to the Father and the 
Son.68 Yet he does have a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. While the Father is esse and the 
Son is form or life, the Holy Spirit is knowledge or understanding.69 Yet, we have just 
seen Victorinus speak of the Son as understanding, the outward understanding that 
understands that it is understanding. Now, however, it is the Holy Spirit that is 
understanding. What is one to make of this? 
Victorinus distinguishes the Father from the Son as esse is distinguished from its 
form or life, as that which is hidden in the Father is distinguished from that which 
manifests what is hidden in the Father. This manifestation, this making manifest, is 
unique. There is but one generation, one “movement” in God.70 As Hadot points out, 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 29, 1–3, pp. 582, 584: “Duae igitur intellegentiae, una intus exsistens, quod est illi esse, 
alia exsistens, quod est illi intellegendo esse. Haec foris, haec filius.” 
67 Ibid., lines 18–23: “Et quia intellegentia est intellegens intellegentiam, cum lumen verum sit 
intellegentia, exsistit lumen ex lumine, et quia intellegentia utraque, verum lumen ex vero lumine. Itemque 
cum deus sit intus intellegentia, ista intellegendo se intellegentia, deus ex deo est.” 
68 See Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., p. 81. 
69 Adversus Arium, IV, 16, 25f., p. 546: “Unde cum Christus vita sit, spiritus autem sanctus, 
scientia et intellegentia …” 
70 Hadot, loc. cit. 
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“L’idée d’une procession propre à l’Esprit-Saint n’est absolument pas présente chez 
Victorinus.”71 
Yet Victorinus distinguishes Son and Holy Spirit. For he views the Trinity as a 
“double-dyad.”72 The first dyad consists of the Father and the Son. These two are one. 
They are distinct in that the Father is actualis exsistentia, while the Son is actus 
exsistentialis.73 This is the distinction between the esse and its act, esse and its form or 
life. Thus far, we have been concerned with this dyad. 
The second “dyad” consists of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Victorinus speaks of 
these two as in one, i.e., in one sole movement.74 For, he insists, there is but one motion 
involved. This one and the same motion is both λόγος and Holy Spirit: λόγος insofar as it 
is life, Holy Spirit insofar as it is knowledge and understanding.75 
We have seen how Victorinus described the generation of the Son in terms of 
understanding’s understanding itself. We are now in a position to examine the role of the 
Holy Spirit in this generation. Victorinus speaks of the Holy Spirit as the mother of the 
Son, Jesus, both above (i.e., in the Trinity) and below (i.e., in the Incarnation).76 His role 
                                                 
71 Ibid. See also P. Sejourné, “Victorinus Afer,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, XV.2, col. 
2925. 
72 The term is Hadot’s (loc. cit. & f.), not, so far as I can find, Victorinus’s. 
73 Adversus Arium, III, 18, 13–17, p. 496: “Prima, tamen, duo unum, diversa hoc ut sit pater, 
actualis exsistentia, id est substantialitas, filius vero, actus exsistentialis … Prima autem duo, et duo unum” 
74 Ibid., lines 15f.: “Duo autem reliqua, ita duo, ut Christus et spiritus sanctus, in uno duo sint, id 
est in motu …” See also ibid., I, 49, 1–3, p. 340: “De deo et λόγῳ, hoc est de patre et filio, dei permissu, 
sufficienter dictum, quoniam unum quae duo. Dictum et de λόγῳ, hoc est de filio et de sancto spiritu, quod 
in uno duo.” 
75 Ibid., 58, 1–4, p. 368: “Quoniam autem diximus unam motionem et eandem, et λόγον et 
sanctum spiritum, λόγον in eo quod vita est, sanctum spiritum, quod est esse cognoscentiam et 
intellegentiam esse, …” 
76 Ibid., lines 11–13: “Non falletur ergo, si quis subintellexerit sanctum spiritum, matrem esse Iesu 
et supra et deorsum, …” See Hadot, “Commentaire” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., p. 874. 
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in the Incarnation does not concern us here,77 but his role in the generation of the Son in 
the Trinity does concern us. Now all knowledge (cognoscentia), as such, is outside what 
it desires to know. In this case then, the knowledge is outside, like an inspectio, according 
as it is the seeing (videre) of itself, i.e., the knowing and seeing of the preexistent power 
of the Father. In this atemporal instant, it goes forth, from that esse which it was, to the 
seeing (in inspiciendum) that which it was.78 Now the Holy Spirit is this excogitation of 
the Father. Thus it is according to this natural way of knowledge, this outwardly effected 
understanding, that the Son is born, that life is made—not from what was not life, but 
because outward life is more truly life (magis vita). For life is in motion.79 
Here, therefore, in an account that goes more deeply than one examined earlier, 
we see that the generation of the Son from the Father comes about in a manner that 
involves, if I may use the word, the “intermediation” on the Holy Spirit.80 Elsewhere, to 
be sure, Victorinus speaks as though it were the other way around. For “all that the Holy 
                                                 
77 See Adversus Arium, I, 58, 14–36, p. 370. 
78 Ibid., 57, 13–19, p. 366: “Omnis enim cognoscentia, secundum quod cognoscentia est, foris est 
ab illo quod cupit cognoscere. Foris autem dico, sicut in inspectione, secundum quod est videre semet 
ipsam, quod est scire vel videre potentiam illam praeexsistentiam et patricam. In isto igitur sine intellectu 
temporis tempore, ab eo quod erat esse veluti egrediens, in inspiciendum ipsum quod erat …” 
79 Ibid., lines 28–33, p. 368: “Sanctus igitur spiritus, motus primus intus, quae sit excogitatio 
patrica, hoc est sui ipsius cognoscentia. Praecognoscentiam enim cognoscentia praecedit. Iuxta istum ergo 
cognoscentiae modum naturalem, foris effectam intellegentiam, natus est filius, vita factus, non quo non 
fuerit vita, sed quoniam foris vita, magis vita; in moto enim vita.” 
80 See the interesting comment on this passage by Hadot, “Commentaire” to Marius Victorinus, 
Henry, ed., p. 873. 
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Spirit has, he receives from Christ, and Christ from the Father.”81 In this respect Christ 
seems to occupy, as it were, the middle position between the Father and the Holy Spirit.82 
The Son and the Holy Spirit, then, constitute the second “dyad” in the Trinity, two 
in one. For there is but one motion, one Son.83 Yet this one motion is both life and 
cognition. Victorinus explicitly says cognitio est vita.84 The λόγος is both motion and the 
Son. Insofar as it is the Son, there is but one Son. Insofar as it is the λόγος, it is double 
(geminus), namely life and cognition,85 Jesus and the Holy Spirit. Victorinus speaks of 
the Son as both life and cognition, existing as Jesus by the work that is life, and as Holy 
Spirit by the work that is cognition, so that there are two “existences,” Christ and the 
Holy Spirit, in the motion that is the Son.86 
If Father and Son are distinguished as esse from its motion or form, how are life 
and cognition distinguished? In short, what is the basis for the distinction within the 
                                                 
81 Adversus Arium, IV, 16, 26–28, p. 546: “… omnia tamen spiritus sanctus quae habet, a Christo 
accepit, Christus a patre …” 
82 Nevertheless it is clear that the Holy Spirit is, for Victorinus, the connecting link between 
Father and Son. See Hymn I, 3, p. 620: “Adesto, sancte spiritus, patris et filii copula.” Also, Hymn III, 242–
47, p. 650: 
Tu, spiritus sancte, conexio es; conexio autem est quicquid conectit 
duo; 
Ita ut conectas omnia, primo conectis duo; 
Esque ipsa tertia conplexio duorum atque ipsa conplexio nihil distans 
uno, unum cum facis duo; 
  O beata trinitas. 
See also J. Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes, II, p. 272. 
83 Adversus Arium, III, 8, 1–5, p. 460: “Ergo motus et unus est motus et a se motus et, cum in patre 
occultus sit atque inde his motus apparens, a patre motus et, quia a motu motus, ideo a se motus et unus 
motus, unde unicus filius.” 
84 Ibid., lines 25f., p. 462: “Cognitio est vita. Porro autem sive vita, sive cognitio, motus est unus 
…” 
85 Ibid., lines 28–31: “Λόγος autem motus est et λόγος filius. Filius igitur unicus in eo quod filius. 
In eo autem quod λόγος, geminus. Ipse enim vita, ipse cognoscentia …” 
86 Ibid., lines 37–42: “Ita dei filius Christus, id est λόγος et filius vita, et, quia idem motus, etiam 
et cognoscentia filius est, opere quo vita est, Iesus exsistens, opere autem quo cognoscentia est, spiritus 
sanctus et ipse exsistens, ut sint exsistentiae duae, Christi et spiritus sancti, in uno motu qui filius est.” 
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second “dyad”? The distinction is, in brief, one of direction of motion.87 Christ is thought 
of as life, a  progression from the Father. The Holy Spirit is thought of as in some way a 
return to the Father. This is in keeping with the characterization of the Holy Spirit as 
cognition, i.e., as the knowledge of the “preexistent power of the Father,”88 and thus, as it 
were, a looking back to the Father. In his third Hymn,89 Victorinus is perhaps most 
explicit on this point. He says, “Status, Progressio, Regressus, O beata Trinitas.”90 
The distinction of persons within the Trinity may thus be summarized as follows: 
the father is esse or power, the Son is life or form, the Holy Spirit is cognition or 
knowledge. In the concise formulae of the third Hymn, Victorinus expresses this triad 
explicitly several times: 
Exsistentia, 
Vita, 
Cognitio, 
 O beata Trinitas. 
…… 
Omnis potentia, 
Omnis actio, 
Omnis agnitio, 
 O beata Trinitas. 
…… 
Substantia deus es, 
Forma filius, 
Notio spiritus, 
 O beata Trinitas. 
…… 
                                                 
87 Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., pp. 81f. See also Henry, “The Adversus 
Arium …,” p. 44. 
88 See n. 79 above. 
89 According to the arrangement in Henry’s edition. In Henry’s article “The Adversus Arium …” 
(loc. cit.) he refers to the hymn as number one. 
90 Hymn III, 71–74, p. 638. 
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Ergo in substantia deus est, in forma λόγος, in notitia 
spiritus sanctus; 
  O beata Trinitas.91 
These three persons, though distinct, are yet one, consubstantial. The Father has 
(or perhaps more properly, is) esse, vivere, intellegere. But, omnia quaecumque habet 
pater mea sunt.92 Thus the Son also has esse, vivere, intellegere. So too does the Holy 
Spirit.93 The three persons are thus indissolubly bound together—are, in fact, 
consubstantial. 
On what then is their distinction based? It is based on “predominance.” The 
notion of “predominance” is one of the very foundations of Victorinus’s Trinitarian 
doctrine. As Hadot says, “Elle joue le rôle de la relation subsistante de la théologie 
ultérieure.”94 Victorinus appeals to this notion several times. He says, e.g., that the Father 
and the Son are consubstantial, the Father insofar as he is esse being also agere, while the 
Son, insofar as he is agere is also esse. Each one has that which he is according to that 
which he is most.95 
Again, the Father is in the Son and conversely. This is why they are one. They are 
two, however, because that which each one is the more appears as different. The Father is 
                                                 
91 Ibid., lines 38–41, 80–83, 151–54, 184–86, pp. 636, 638, 644, 646. 
92 John 16:15. 
93 Adversus Arium, IV, 18, 10–13, p. 550: “Sic enim subiunxit: omnia quaecumque habet pater 
mea sunt; propterea dixi mea sunt quia, quae pater habet, filii sunt, esse, vivere, intellegere. Haec eadem 
habet spiritus sanctus. Omnia ergo ὁμοούσια.” 
94 Hadot, “Introduction” to Marius Victorinus, Henry, ed., p. 80. 
95 Adversus Arium, I, 20, 12–15, p. 236: “ὁμοούσιοι pater et filius, patre exsistente secundum quod 
est esse, etiam quod est agere, filio autem exsistente secundum quod est agere, etiam quod est esse, 
unoquoque habente id quod sit iuxta quod maxime est …” 
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predominantly power, the Son action. Therefore, the Son is different, because he is more 
actio, insofar as he is an outward actio.96 
Yet again, speaking this time of all three persons, Victorinus says that God has 
three powers, namely esse, vivere and intellegere. The three are in each one, and each one 
is the three. Each one takes the name of that by which it predominates.97 
Thus the notion of predominance provides Victorinus with the means to ensure at 
the same both the consubstantiality and the distinction of the three persons of the Trinity. 
If predominance tells us how the persons are distinguished, the triad esse, vivere, 
intellegere tells us what it is that predominates in each case. The notion of the Trinity as a 
double-dyad—the first dyad being distinguished as power is distinguished from motion 
or act, the second dyad being distinguished according to the directions of this motion—
sheds further light on the intimate interrelations among the three. Finally, the distinctions 
of the various ways of not being and the various levels of being enable us to locate the 
persons of the Trinity in Victorinus’s universe.98 
                                                 
96 Ibid., II, 3, 39–44, p. 402: “Ergo et pater in filio et filius in patre, sed utrumque in singulis, et 
idcirco unum; duo autem, quia quod magis est, id alterum apparet; magis autem pater potentia, et actio 
filius, et idcirco alter, quia magis actio; magis enim actio quia foris actio.” 
97 Ibid., IV, 21, 26–29, p. 564: “Τριδύναμος est deus, id est tres potentias habens, esse, vivere, 
intellegere, ita ut in singulis tria sint sitque ipsum unum quodlibet tria, nomen, qua se praestat, accipiens, ut 
supra docui et in multis.” 
98 The Holy Spirit would presumably occupy ontologically the same level as the Son, namely at 
the summit of all that is and all that is not. For the Son and the Holy Spirit are two in one, namely in the 
one same movement. Victorinus does not, however, explicitly treat the question of the “location” of the 
Holy Spirit, as he does for the Father and the Son in his Ad Candidum. 
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III 
Having outlined the main points of Victorinus’s doctrine, let me now make some 
observations on what he has done. To this end, Étienne Gilson’s remarks about 
Victorinus will serve as a backdrop against which to view my own conclusions. 
By and large, Gilson’s opinion of Victorinus is not very favorable. He speaks of 
Victorinus’s letter Ad Candidum as “as confused as the objections of Candidus were 
clear.”99 Again, he says that Victorinus follows Plotinus “with at least the illusion that he 
is still speaking as a Christian,” that “all we can do here is to recommend Victorinus to 
the indulgence of modern theologians,” or again, “to the indulgence of modern exegetes.” 
Yet again, “he is doing about as well as could be done without giving up the supremacy 
of the One over being,” or “theologically speaking, this was a pretty mess.”100 
I do not think Victorinus’s Trinitarian theology is as bad as all that. As far as I can 
tell, it is for the most part both internally consistent and careful to preserve a balance 
between the consubstantiality and the distinction of the persons. (This is not to say, of 
course, that it is clear or lucid.) 
There is, however, a serious difficulty regarding the relations of the Son, Christ 
and the Holy Spirit. Victorinus has spoken of the Son as one motion, in which there are 
two “existences,” Christ and the Holy Spirit.101 This seems singularly unsatisfactory, but 
it is hard to know just how to criticize the notion. Does it separate the Son from Christ? 
Not exactly. For it is still true to say that Christ is the Son of God. On the other hand, 
                                                 
99 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy …, p. 67. 
100 For all these, see Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 32f. 
101 See n. 86 above. 
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Victorinus’s way of speaking makes it also true to say that the Holy Spirit is the Son of 
God. But this means only that he is consubstantial with the Son of God. What then? This 
perspective makes it hard to see how the relation between Christ and the Son could be 
any different than that between the Holy Spirit and the Son, namely a relation of “mere” 
consubstantiality. But the Son is himself consubstantial with the Father. Thus, it seems, 
there would either be four consubstantial persons in the “Trinity”—namely, Father, Son, 
Christ, and Holy Spirit—or else, apparently, either the Son or Christ would not be a fully 
constituted “person.” 
Perhaps we are, in this instance, putting too much weight on a manner of 
speaking. Yet it remains true that the Holy Spirit occupies a very problematic place in 
Victorinus’s Trinity. 
Despite the ambiguities, however, I do not see that Victorinus’s doctrine is as 
confused as Gilson suggests. 
Gilson in effect criticizes Victorinus for trying to be too neo-Platonic in his 
Christian theologizing, and in particular for his placing the Father above and beyond 
being, as πρόον.102 But while there may be perfectly good philosophical reasons for 
criticizing Victorinus on just this point, I maintain that Gilson has not properly evaluated 
the role this view plays in Victorinus’s thought. 
                                                 
102 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 31–33. 
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“Since the difficulty [raised by Candidus] originated,” says Gilson, “in the 
Platonist identification of being with immutability, Victorinus resorted to the doctrine of 
Plotinus, according to whom even ‘being’ was inferior to unity.”103 
But this seems to miss the point. Such a metaphysical step could hardly in itself 
release Victorinus from the problem raised by Candidus. If Candidus’s difficulties were 
caused by the fact that the being he called God was immutable, the problem is not going 
to be solved simply by saying that God is not being, as long as it remains true to say that 
God is immutable. The difficulty is not that being is immutable, but that God is 
immutable, whether he is thought of as being or as above being. Now Victorinus 
expressly states that the Father has no otherness in him,104 and, since otherness is tied up 
with change in the Platonic tradition,105 this apparently means that the Father is 
immutable. The problem is thus not to be solved by revising our notion of God, putting 
him above Being, but by analyzing the notion of generation. 
This is what Victorinus does. Candidus maintained that the Son was not generated 
by God, since this would imply a motion or change in God, but was rather made by God 
out of nothing. Victorinus counters by asking, “Is not making a motion?” Candidus had 
solved his problem on one level, only to have it reappear on another. Victorinus 
                                                 
103 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy …, p. 67. 
104 Adversus Arium, I, 49, 9–12, p. 342: “Ante omnia quae vere sunt, unum fuit, sive unalitas, sive 
ipsum unum, antequam sit ei esse, unum. Illud enim unum oportet dicere et intellegere quod nullam 
imaginationem alteritatis habet …” 
105 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 14. 
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concludes that we must therefore grant that not every motion implies a change. But then 
Candidus’s objection against divine generation falls to the ground.106 
Victorinus’s reply to Candidus does not therefore consist, as Gilson would seem 
to have it, in placing God above being, but in showing that not every motion is a change. 
But then what role is left to the claim that God is above being? How does this view 
function in Victorinus’s thought? 
It is fair to say that Victorinus probably did not import the notion into his thought 
with any particular purpose in mind. Rather it was part and parcel of the neo-Platonic 
heritage he brought with him to his theological speculation. Be that as it may, the notion 
nevertheless serves him well. For it ensures that the Father is in himself unknowable. 
Being is, for Victorinus, tied up with intelligibility. Since the Father is above being, he is 
strictly unknowable. The Son, however, as the highest in the hierarchy of quae sunt, is 
indeed knowable. Thus, Victorinus’s ontology provides him with a way of making some 
sense out of the theological notion of the Son as revealing the Father, an idea he 
frequently repeats. It is through the Son (form) that the Father is known, even by the 
Father.107 
                                                 
106 Ad Candidum, no. 30, 1–17, pp. 168, 170: “Habes nunc, quod reliquum est, o mi Candide, 
dicere: si filius Iesus, generatione filius; si autem generatio motus et motus inmutatio, inmutationem autem 
esse in deo inpossibile est intellegere, nefas dicere, necesse est a deo nihil esse generatione gignibile; non 
igitur Iesus a deo generatione filius. Bono quidem ordine circumduxisti, o amice Candide; sed quem 
circumduxisti? Forte te? Sed magis te. Dicis enim, quoniam fecit Iesum deus. Quid deinde? Facere non est 
motus? Nihilo minus quam agere. Inmutatio igitur et in faciendo, si motus in agendo. Agere autem facere 
est et quod facere agere. Ambobus in motu exsistentibus, necessario consequitur inmutatio, quod 
incongruum in deo, sicuti declaratum est. Confitendum igitur aut facere non esse motum aut non omnem 
motum esse inmutationem. Sed enim facere motus est et deus iuxta motum fecit, cui omnino non contingit 
quomodocumque mutari. Relinquitur ergo non omnem motum inmutationem esse.” 
107 See n. 51 above. 
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It can be said that Victorinus developed a reasonably coherent doctrine of the 
Trinity. It is heavily influenced by neo-Platonic inspiration, but nonetheless original and 
on the whole consistent. It is not without its problems, particularly with respect to the 
Holy Spirit, but it does not deserve the criticism Gilson raises against it. 
  
 
 
26
Sources 
Altaner, Berthold, and Stuiber, Alfred. Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre 
der Kirchenvater, 7th ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1966. 
Aurelius Augustinus. Sancti Aurelii Augustini Confessionum libri tredecim, 
(“Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum,” 33), Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1896. 
Bardenhewer, Otto. Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, III (Das vierte 
Jahrhundert mit Ausschluss der Schriftsteller syrischer Zunge), Freiburg im Breisgau: 
Herder & Co., 1923. 
Benz, Ernst. Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendländischen 
Willensmetaphysik, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932. 
Gilson, Étienne. Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952. 
_____. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York: Random 
House, 1955. 
Gore, Charles. “Victorinus,” in A Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, 
Sects and Doctrines during the First Eight Centuries, Being a Continuation of “The 
Dictionary of the Bible,” W. Smith and H. Dace, ed., London: John Murray, 1887. 
Hadot, Paul. “Introduction,” translation and “Commentaire” to Henry, ed., Marius 
Victorinus, described below, q. v. 
 
 
27
_____. “Marius Victorinus,” in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967), IX, p. 231. 
Henry, Paul. “The Adversus Arium of Marius Victorinus, the First Systematic 
Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Journal of Theological Studies, n. s. 1 (1950), 
pp. 42–55. 
_____, ed. Marius Victorinus: Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, (“Sources 
chrétiennes,” nos. 68–69), 2 vols. paginated consecutively; Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 
1960. 
_____. Plotin et l’occident, Louvain: “Specilegium Sacrum Lovaniense” bureaux, 
1934. 
Kohnke, Friedrich Wilhelm, “Plato’s Conception of τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,” 
Phronesis 2 (1957), pp. 32–40. 
Labriolle, Pierre de. History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to 
Boethius, Herbert Wilson, trans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925. 
Marius Victorinus. Marius Victorinus: Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, Henry, 
ed., described above, q. v. 
Monceaux, Paul. Histoire littéraire de l’Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines 
jusq’à l’invasion arabe, III, (“Le IVe siècle, d’Arnobe à Victorin”), Paris: Ernest Leroux, 
1905. 
Migne, Jacques-Paul, ed. Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina,  221 vols., 
Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1844–65. (Abbreviated “PL.”) 
 
 
28
Séjourné, P. “Victorinus, Afer,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Paris: 
Libraire Letouzey et Ané, 1950, vol. XV.2, cols. 2887–954. 
Souter, Alexander. The Earliest Latin Commentaries on the Epistles of Saint 
Paul: A Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927. 
Tillemonet, Sébastien le Nain de. Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire 
eccléstiastique des six primiers siècles, X, Paris: Charles Robustel, 1705. 
Tixeront, J. Histoire des dogmes dans l’antiquité chrétienne, II (De Saint 
Athanase à Saint Augustine), (“Bibliothèque de l’enseignement de l’histoire 
ecclésiastique”), 8th ed., Paris: Libraire Victor Lecoffre, 1924). 
Travis, Albert H. “Marius Victorinus: A Biographical Note,” The Harvard 
Theological Review, 36 (1943), pp. 83–90. 
Überweg-Praechter, Geschichte der Philosophie, I (Die Philosophie  des 
Altertums), 12th ed., Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1926. 
